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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
IN
OPERATION DESERT STORM**



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
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Port Operations



Adding Value to the Total Force and to the Nation

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 3 MAY 1991	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED FINAL	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM: PORT OPERATIONS			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) JOHN R. BRINKERHOFF, TED SILVA, JOHN SEITZ				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) ANDRULIS RESEARCH CORPORATION 2121 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER CONTRACT NUMBER: MDA 903-90-D-0033	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) HQDA ATTN: DAAR-PAE 2400 ARMY PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2400			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT N/A	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT N/A	



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ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2400



FOREWORD

This is one in a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in winning the war in the Persian Gulf. Countless reports have been written and numerous books published about the coalition victory. None have appeared, however, that focus on the valuable contributions of Army Reserve soldiers and civilians to the favorable outcome of the conflict. This monograph and others in the series fill that void.

This report on the role of the Army Reserve in Port Operations demonstrates how indispensable the capabilities of the Army Reserve are to Total Force effectiveness in time of war. Highly trained and technically competent Army Reserve soldiers were called upon to exercise their skills in managing ports of embarkation and debarkation, loading and unloading the ships used to transport personnel and equipment to the theater of operations. Such specialized skills, unaffordable or in short supply in the Active Army during peacetime, are economically maintained and readily provided by the Army Reserve at the time of an emergency. Sixteen of 25 Army Reserve units belonging to the Military Traffic Management Command were activated during Operation Desert Storm. Reserve soldiers in the remaining nine units also supported the deployment and redeployment during periods of annual training or extended temporary tours of active duty. The stellar performance of all was the clear result of years of experience in relevant civilian jobs and in periodic training exercises with Active Component counterparts.

Other monographs will describe the roles of a variety of Army Reserve units and individual soldiers. They will include civil affairs specialists, communicators, transporters, engineers, trainers, military police, medical personnel and strategic intelligence units. These monographs, and the results of additional research on Army Reserve contributions to operations in the Persian Gulf, will be bound eventually in a single volume.

Your comments on this and future issuances are most welcome.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

RONALD E. SMITH
Colonel, General Staff
Chief, Program Analysis and
Evaluation Division

**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

Port Operations

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Contract Number: MDA 903-90-D-0033, Delivery Order 1

Name of Contractor: ANDRULIS Research Corporation

Contract Project Director and Phone Number: John Seitz, (703) ~~820-3204~~
521-6671

Government Sponsor: OCAR PA&E, LTC Samuel A. McNabb, COR
DSN 225-2288

3 May 1991

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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

Port Operations

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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
Operation DESERT STORM

PORT OPERATIONS

Opening the Port of Jacksonville for DESERT STORM

On Friday morning, 10 August 1990, Colonel Robert A. McInvale, United States Army Reserve, drove into the Port of Jacksonville, Florida, with a big job to do. Brigadier General H. A. Smith, Commander of the Eastern Area of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), had given him the mission of opening the Port and loading the equipment of the 101st Airborne Division for rapid movement to Saudi Arabia in support of OPERATION DESERT STORM.¹ Colonel Bob McInvale knew what to do, but he had little help. The Port of Jacksonville was almost inactive as far as the Department of Defense was concerned. There were no soldiers or civilian employees, and only one trailer and one telephone were available. The first cargo from the 101st Airborne Division was due to arrive at the Port late on Sunday, 12 August 1990. The situation was urgent.

Colonel McInvale was an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) assigned as the Deputy Commander for Mobilization of the Eastern Area of MTMC. He had been called by General Smith early on 8 August and asked to report to MTMC Eastern Area Headquarters, Bayonne, NJ, as soon as possible. That evening, Colonel McInvale met with General Smith and was given the mission of loading the 101st Airborne Division. Colonel McInvale flew to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, on 9 August, met with the division staff, and made plans to receive the division's equipment at the Port of Jacksonville. Early on 10 August, Colonel McInvale flew to Jacksonville to initiate port operations.

Colonel McInvale put together a composite transportation terminal unit composed of groups from many different sources.² The first group to arrive at the Port on 10 August was a team of two military personnel and five civilians from the MTMC Cape Canaveral Detachment, commanded by Major John L. Wicinski. Major Wicinski and his team set out immediately to establish a logistical support base. A three person operations analysis team from the Transportation Engineering Activity (TEA) headed by Major Stephen S. Slyfield arrived on 11 August and started work to plan the organization of the port for loading ships with military cargo.

This provided the cadre of skilled workers to open the Port, but more help was needed. On Saturday, 11 August, Colonel McInvale located some Army Reserve units just finishing their annual training near Jacksonville. He asked them for help and 30 Reservists volunteered to work at the Port over the weekend.

Colonel McInvale and his team obtained additional working space, brought in 14 more telephones, and leased space from automobile importers to provide room to stage the military equipment for loading onto the ships. Contracts were let for longshoremen to place the equipment on board the ships and tie it down.

On the 12th of August, MTMC received permission to accept volunteers from the US Army Reserve. Sixty volunteer Reservists were sent to Jacksonville from 6 different Reserve units. The first thirty volunteers started to show up on Monday morning, 13 August, and were put to work as they arrived. On the morning of 15 August, thirty additional volunteer reservists began to arrive.

A team of 24 military and civilian personnel from the Western Area of MTMC, including some Reservist volunteers, arrived beginning on 13 August under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel James L. Spring and Mr John Seaton. This highly skilled unit joined the others in working 13 hour shifts.³

The Port Support Activity (PSA) arrived on 14 August from Fort Benning, GA. The PSA for Jacksonville was planned to come from Fort Stewart, GA, but the workload at that installation in preparing the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) for deployment and supporting Hunter Army Airfield, gave Fort Stewart all it could handle. The mission was given to Fort Benning, which did the job with enthusiasm. PSA strength at Jacksonville averaged 150 and varied from 50 to 300 during the loading out.

On 22 August, General Smith ordered Colonel McInvale to act as deputy commander and trouble shooter for the entire Eastern Area, and Colonel Richard G. Simmons, USAR, became Port Commander at Jacksonville. Colonel Simmons was a volunteer Reservist who commanded the 1181st Transportation Terminal Unit (TTU), Meridian, MS. Colonel Simmons had offered his assistance on 11 August 1990 and was the first MTMC Reservist to volunteer. As soon as the decision was made to use Colonel McInvale in a broader role, Colonel Simmons' offer was accepted, and he was brought on board 14 August to take over the night shift and have a week's overlap with Colonel McInvale before taking over as Port Commander.

This pick-up crew of active component soldiers, civilians, Reservists on training tours, and Reservists who volunteered for active duty operated the Port of Jacksonville from 10 August until 27 August 1990. During that time, they loaded out almost the entire 101st Airborne Division. They worked seven days a week and put in some 20 hour shifts getting the job done. The Jacksonville Port was ready when the ships and the equipment came, and the first ship was loaded in 3 days and all ten ships for the 101st Airborne Division in 20 days.

Although the improvised unit was doing the job, the troops were getting tired and needed reinforcements. They needed a full Reserve TTU. As Lieutenant Colonel Jim Spring said, "It was our job to stick our finger in the dike and hold it until the reserves came."⁴

On 22 August, the President authorized the call up of Selected Reserve units and IMAs. Eight MTMC Reserve units, including the 1181st TTU, were called to active duty on 27 August 1990. The 1181st TTU already had 20 members working as volunteers at Jacksonville Port. The rest of the unit showed up to relieve the pick up crews, and Colonel Simmons was in command of both his own unit and the Port of Jacksonville. Gradually, things settled down to a normal--but never routine--operation. On 30 August the Western Area Team flew back to their own ports, which by now were also busy loading out Army and Marine Corps units from the West Coast. Some of the Reserve volunteers went back to civilian life; others stayed on at Jacksonville or moved to help out at other ports.

Colonel McInvale, Colonel Simmons and their soldiers and civilians did the job. With superb leadership from their boss, Eastern Area Commander Brigadier General H A Smith, and enthusiastic participation by Active Army personnel, Reservists, civilians, contractors, and longshoremen, the equipment of the 101st Airborne Division was loaded on ships and sent to the Persian Gulf in record time.

It was a triumph for American ingenuity and knowhow, for improvisation in the face of emergency, and above all it was a triumph for the Total Army Concept.

The Military Traffic Management Command

The job of loading the ships to take the equipment and cargo of the units deploying to the Persian Gulf for OPERATION DESERT STORM was the responsibility of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).⁵ This agency is a component of the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The other components of TRANSCOM are the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Military Airlift Command (MAC). MSC has a Navy flavor; MAC is predominately Air Force; and MTMC is mostly Army. Like the other components of TRANSCOM, MTMC is staffed by members of all Military Services and supports the transportation needs of the entire Department of Defense.

MTMC is a transportation manager, operator, and advisor. Unlike the Military Airlift Command and Military Sealift Command, MTMC does not own any planes or ships. It provides the link between Defense needs and commercial rail, highway, and inland waterway carriers. As a manager, MTMC directs all military freight, personal property, and passenger movement in the United States and overseas. As an operator, it operates common user water terminals throughout the world and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. As an advisor, it

recommends system improvements and transportation policies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MTMC also is the center for transportation engineering for ports, inland waterways, railroads, highways, pipelines, and air facilities. MTMC has a big job.⁶

MTMC is organized into four major subordinate commands. MTMC Eastern Area manages transportation and operates ports on the East and Gulf Coasts of the US from its headquarters at Bayonne, NJ. MTMC Europe, located near Rotterdam, The Netherlands, manages transportation and operates ports throughout Europe. MTMC Western Area, headquartered at Oakland, CA, manages transportation and operates ports on the West Coast of the US, Japan, Korea, and the Pacific area. The Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA), located at Newport News, VA, provides its services to the other MTMC organizations and DOD as a whole. Headquarters, MTMC is located in Falls Church, VA.⁷

One of the numerous missions of MTMC is to operate the sea ports from which military equipment, cargo, and personnel are loaded for shipment to overseas locations. MTMC helps the units to prepare for overseas deployment, move from mobilization station to the sea ports, and is responsible for loading the unit equipment and cargo onto the ships. It is this aspect of the MTMC mission with which the Reserve units are involved.

MTMC is staffed in peacetime to manage routine movement of freight, household goods, and passengers at very low levels of activity. A capability for rapid expansion is built into MTMC by having Reservists earmarked for assignment to the command upon mobilization. The strength of the various components of MTMC on 1 August 1990 is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Personnel Strength of MTMC on 1 August 1990

	HQs & TEA	Eastern Area	Europe	Western Area	Total
Active Military Personnel	87	155	226	252	720
Civilian Employees ⁸	609	1,229	290	914	3,042
Naval Reservists ⁹	-	12	-	10	22
US Army Reservists	40	1,679	75	338	2,132
Total	726	3,075	591	1,514	5,916

The total potential strength of MTMC just prior to OPERATION DESERT STORM was 12.2% active military personnel; 51.4% civilian employees; and 36.4% Army Reservists. Of the Army Reservists, 1,841 were assigned to units, and 291 were assigned to billets in MTMC organizations as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). In terms of military strength the Reservists outnumbered the active personnel three-to-one. Clearly, the ability of MTMC to expand rapidly to handle extra work load for a mobilization depended on having the Reservists available at the start.

MTMC Army Reserve Units

Twenty-seven Army Reserve units are designated in the force structure for MTMC, in the event of mobilization. These are 3 Deployment Control Units; 18 Transportation Terminal Units; and 3 Port Security Detachments. There are also two Cargo Documentation Detachments and one Railway Support Unit.¹⁰ The job of the MTMC Army Reserve units is to execute a deployment of military forces. Reserve units help the deploying units prepare for movement at their mobilization stations and move from the mobilization stations to an air or sea port. They also load the unit equipment and cargo onto ships. This is what the US Army Reserve did during OPERATION DESERT STORM.

Deployment Control Units

The deployment process starts at the mobilization station with the Deployment Control Unit (DCU). This unit is designed to provide consulting services to the deploying units and the installations from which the units are moving. A DCU has an authorized strength of 83, composed of 39 officers and 44 enlisted personnel. The unit sends out 12 teams of 6 soldiers--3 officers and 3 enlisted personnel headed by a major--to deploying installations or units. The DCU team works with the Installation Transportation Officer (ITO) at the mobilization station. The DCU team helps the deploying units plan and execute the preparation and outloading of organic unit equipment. The team also provides liaison and coordination for movement of the units from mobilization stations to the designated surface terminals--ports. The DCU supports both road convoy and rail operations. The DCU helps smooth loading operations at the port by ensuring equipment is configured properly, documented, labeled, and in conformity with standards for shipping hazardous cargo and other standards established by MTMC.

The DCU team helps the deploying unit obtain LOGMARS identification labels and with putting them on their equipment. LOGMARS stands for Logistical Marking and Reading System.¹¹ The system employs bar codes like those used in supermarket checkouts. Using

special equipment, TTU personnel at the port prepare bar coded labels based on lists of unit equipment. DCU and TTU personnel use scanners to read the bar codes and check the identity of each item of equipment.

The DCU team inspects all items of equipment prior to departure from the mobilization station, prepares load plans for rail cars, provides advice and assistance on loading and tying down the equipment and cargo on rail cars, trailers, or vehicles, and helps prepare bills of lading. The teams notify the port of any variances and work to make the movement to port as smooth as possible.¹²

The three DCUs in the US Army Reserve are the 1179th, Brooklyn, NY; 1190th, Baton Rouge, LA; and the 1394th, Camp Pendleton, CA. The 1190th DCU was one of the original units called to active duty to support the movement of the units in the eastern part of the United States. Subsequently, the 1394th DCU was called to active duty to do the same thing for units in the western part of the country. The 1179th was not called to active duty for the deployment phase, but is planned to participate in the redeployment.

Transportation Terminal Units

A Transportation Terminal Unit (TTU) is designed to manage traffic operations at a Military Port. A TTU is authorized 75 military personnel--28 officers and 47 enlisted personnel. Each member of a TTU is a highly trained specialist in port operations. A TTU works in teams or shifts to manage the loading of more than one ship at a time. Each member works independently to fulfill his or her part as a member of a team. The job of the TTU is to plan, arrange, and supervise the loading of military equipment and cargo on ships. The principal tasks of the TTU are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Transportation Terminal Unit Tasks

Prepare a loading plan for each ship.
Receive equipment & cargo from mobilization stations.
Locate and stage equipment for loading.
Check the LOGMARs labels on each piece of equipment.
Prepare the manifest for each ship loaded.
Contract for equipment and longshoremen to load ships.
Coordinate with other organizations involved in the port.
Provide security for equipment and cargo at the port.
Coordinate all activities involved in loading the ships.

The TTU commander normally is also the Port Commander. When a port has more than one TTU, the senior TTU commander may be the Port Commander, or a Task Force Commander may be designated by MTMC to command the port. The Port Commander has several additional elements supporting him in that role.

The Port Support Activity (PSA) is an ad hoc organization provided by an Army installation--usually the installation where the deploying units are stationed. The job of the PSA is to provide administrative and logistical support for the operations of the port and the loading process. A PSA provides mechanics, cooks, drivers, security personnel, administrative clerks, and whatever else is needed to assure that the port can operate effectively. The PSA can vary in strength from 100 to 300 depending on the size and scope of the work at a port.

Stevedoring contractors actually perform the loading of the ships under the supervision of TTU personnel. The TTU lets contracts with the local contractors, who in turn employ longshoremen to do the actual work of placing the equipment and cargo on the ship and tying it down. The contractors obtain the services of the longshoremen through hiring agreements with the local unions.

The Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) of MTMC may provide a small detachment to the port to provide technical data, such as ship characteristics and advice on how to load and secure outsized equipment. The TEA proved to be an invaluable member of the MTMC team during DESERT STORM.

The most important part of deploying a unit is careful documentation of the equipment and cargo. Documentation means the marking of each item so that it can be controlled during the movement and so that accountability can be maintained. Documentation is required to

prepare the ship's manifest and to let the ports on the other end know what is coming, what ship is carrying it, and where on each ship an item is located. With items from a single unit sometimes spread over several ships, this documentation is needed to assure rapid identification and delivery to the correct units in the combat theater.

The 18 Transportation Terminal Units in the Army Reserve, their home stations, and their involvement in OPERATION DESERT STORM are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3.

Army Reserve Transportation Terminal Units

Unit	Home Station	Initial Volunteers?	Used While Training?	Called Up?
1169th TTU	Boston, MA	No	No	No *
1170th TTU	Boston, MA	No	No	No
1172nd TTU	Boston, MA	No	No	No *
1173rd TTU	Boston, MA	No	Yes	No *
1174th TTU	Fort Totten, NY	Yes	Yes	No
1175th TTU	Pedricktown, NY	Yes	No	No *
1176th TTU	Baltimore, MD	Yes	No	Yes
1181st TTU	Meridian, MS	Yes	No	Yes
1182nd TTU	Charleston, SC	Yes	Yes	No *
1184th TTU	Mobile, AL	Yes	Yes	No *
1185th TTU	Lancaster, PA	No	Yes	Yes
1186th TTU	Tampa, FL	Yes	No	Yes
1188th TTU	Kings Point, GA	No	No	No *
1189th TTU	Charleston, SC	Yes	Yes	No *
1191st TTU	New Orleans, LA	Yes	No	Yes
1192nd TTU	New Orleans, LA	Yes	No	Yes
1395th TTU	Seattle, WA	No	Yes	No
1397th TTU	Seattle, WA	No	Yes	No *

* Planned for call up for redeployment.

Port Security Detachments

A Port Security Detachment (PSD) is designed to provide physical security to a military port during loading operations. A full detachment is authorized 3 officers and 64 enlisted personnel, and is authorized a captain as commander.¹³ The duties of a Port Security

Detachment include issuing passes to control access to port areas, manning traffic control points, patrolling rail and wharf areas, inspecting vehicles, escorting convoys and visitors, and guarding equipment and sensitive cargo.¹⁴ The PSD works with other port security elements, including the Coast Guard, the local police forces, and other military elements.

The three PSDs in the US Army Reserve are the 1302nd, Orangeburg, NY; the 4249th, Pocahontas, IA; and the 6632nd, Los Alamitos, CA. The 1302nd and 4249th PSDs were called up in the initial increment. The 1302nd PSD provided detachments for the ports at Houston, Jacksonville, Savannah, and Bayonne. The 4249th PSD provided security initially at Wilmington and subsequently at the ammunition terminal at Sunny Point. The 6632nd PSD was called up later to provide additional security at Sunny Point as well as detachments for some of the Western Area ports.

Initial MTMC Operations

The Deployment Operation

When faced with the initial deployment for OPERATION DESERT STORM, the staff at Headquarters MTMC realized that they would have to utilize several ports simultaneously to meet the time requirements. They also realized that they would need their Reserve units to do the job. The basic premise of MTMC planning has always been that the MTMC Reserve units would be mobilized immediately in the event of a deployment. In this case, however, that premise turned out to be faulty.

On 9 August 1990 MTMC Eastern Area requested that their Reserve units be called up, and this request was passed through MTMC Headquarters to Department of the Army. However, neither the Department of the Army nor the Department of Defense had decided to call up Reservists at this stage of the operation. For the first 22 days of the deployment, therefore, MTMC had to resort to improvisation to support the initial deployments to the Persian Gulf. Composite terminal units were formed on an ad hoc basis to do the job. These units were a quarter active duty military personnel, a quarter MTMC civilians, and half volunteer Reservists. This approach got the job done for the initial two, critical weeks.

As General Piatak puts it: "We were in a quandary as to what to do. Fortunately, the word got around in Reserve channels, and people volunteered to come in and work."¹⁵

Getting the Reserve Volunteers

Even though the Reservists were willing, there still remained the task of obtaining approval even to use them as volunteers. Major General Joseph H Brooks, USAR, Deputy Commander of MTMC for Mobilization, had been called on 8 August 1990 and told to report into the headquarters. General Brooks reported early on 10 August 1990 and undertook to get some Reserve volunteers on board. At the same time Eastern Area was contacting its Reserve units to find out which Reservists might volunteer to help man the ports. This early action by Eastern Area to identify potential volunteers saved a lot of time once authority for accepting volunteers was obtained.

Without a Presidential call up, it was not clear that it would even be possible to bring volunteer Reservists on active duty and pay them to perform active Army work. By law, Reserve training funds are to be used only to perform training. Colonel Ronald A Kutka, the full-time Senior Reserve Advisor at Headquarters MTMC, concluded that it would be appropriate to use funds for temporary tours of active duty for this purpose. However, a call to the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) on Friday, 10 August 1990, brought the response that there was little money available for temporary tours of active duty, but they would look at it on Monday. The MTMC response was that waiting until Monday was not acceptable because action was needed right away.¹⁶

MTMC Headquarters followed up their telephone call with official messages to the Army Staff and the Army Personnel Center requesting authority to accept Reserve volunteers immediately. No answer was received, even though MTMC was told on Saturday, 11 August 1990, that the messages were received. At this point a fortuitous event may have helped speed the approval. General Gordon Sullivan, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, was visiting General Smith at MTMC Eastern Area Headquarters on 11 August 1990. General Smith pointed up the extreme difficulty MTMC would have in meeting the deployment schedules without the Reservists and urged that authority be given to accept volunteers for active duty. General Sullivan responded positively to this and instructed a member of his party to take care of the matter.¹⁷

While waiting for approval, Eastern Area Headquarters was contacting the Reservists who had indicated they would volunteer and instructing them to get ready to move at a moment's notice. The deploying units were being told to move their equipment to the ports, but the ports were not manned sufficiently to do the job of loading the equipment. The situation was getting critical.

Meanwhile, the personnel at MTMC Headquarters were working around the clock and their need to obtain the Reserve volunteers was more pronounced. A telephone call placed to PERSCOM just after midnight on Sunday, 12 August 1990, indicated that no decision had been made on the request. In desperation, Mr Ben Bear, of the MTMC Operations Center, called

Colonel Duane Lempke, Chief of the Accessions, Reserve Appointments, and Management Division of PERSCOM, at his home at 0515 on Sunday morning. Colonel Lempke understood the urgency of the situation and approved the first 150 volunteers for temporary tours of active duty (TTAD) on the spot. The oral approval was confirmed formally the next day and was increased later to 200 volunteers.¹⁸ The first volunteers were brought on board on 13 August, and by 19 August, MTMC Eastern Area had all 200 volunteers on board. This made it possible to do the job in the early days.

Calling Up the Reserve Units

The composite units were small, and the volunteers were being overworked. After 2 weeks of operating in this mode, it became clear that additional personnel were needed. This meant that entire Reserve TTUs had to be made available right away.

On 22 August 1990, President Bush authorized the call up of Reserve units, and the Army issued orders two days later. The MTMC Reserve units reported to work on 27 August. This was a very rapid response to the call up. Initially, five TTUs, one DCU, and two PSDs were called to active duty involuntarily. By 31 August 1990, MTMC had over 500 Reservists on active duty involuntarily and another 140 still working as volunteers. Later, an additional TTU was called up; a TTU was inactivated; and one more DCU and the remaining two PSDs were called up. With the arrival of the Reserve units, the outloading process was reconfigured to complete the scheduled deployments in a more normal manner.

Just as the work to deploy the initial units to the Persian Gulf was about completed, another wave of deployments began. On 7 November 1990, the President announced that he was sending additional forces from the United States and Europe to provide an offensive capability in the theater. The initial deployments from 7 August to 7 November 1990 became Phase I, and the subsequent deployments from 7 November 1990 to 16 January 1991, when combat operations started, became Phase II. MTMC was loading general cargo and munitions throughout both phases.

Cessation of offensive operations occurred on 27 February 1991, and a formal cease fire was signed on 9 March 1991. The victory of Coalition Forces over Iraq caused MTMC to undertake the third and final phase of OPERATION DESERT STORM--redeployment of the forces back to the United States or Europe. Army Reservists of MTMC would once again be stretched in this final phase.

Phase I Operations

The deployment of units and cargo for OPERATION DESERT STORM was a global operation, and it was a big operation. Ports in the United States, Europe, and the Pacific Theater were used to load materiel going to the Persian Gulf. Loading operations during Phase I focused on ports on the East Coast and the Gulf of Mexico. About three-quarters of the equipment and cargo were loaded from these ports, and the remaining 25% from West Coast ports. Although the operations at ports manned entirely or in part by Reservists are emphasized in this paper, there was intense activity at many other ports manned by active military personnel and civilians, such as Okinawa and Livorno, Italy.

The size of this initial deployment can be appreciated by comparing it with the initial deployment phases of other recent wars. Figure 4. compares the first 60 days for the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and OPERATION DESERT STORM for both cargo and passengers.¹⁹ There is no doubt that this was by far the largest operation of its kind--ever. This underscores the significance of having trained Army Reservists ready to augment MTMC to get the job done.

Figure 4.

Comparison of Recent US Military Deployments

First 60 Days

	Korean War	Vietnam War	DESERT STORM
Tonnage of Cargo	400,437	240,000	520,000
Passengers	22,716	85,562	107,039

East Coast Operations

The first big job for the East Coast ports was to load the equipment of the 101st Airborne Division and the 24th Mechanized Division rapidly so that the troops which had been airlifted to Saudi Arabia would have something to fight with, if necessary. This involved primarily the ports of Jacksonville, FL, and Savannah, GA. Additional combat units were loaded out through the ports of Beaumont and Houston, TX. At the same time the job of loading equipment for the combat support and combat service support units had to be done. This involved all of the ports in MTMC Eastern Area. Reserve units were involved in the operations at the ports of

Jacksonville; Savannah; Wilmington, NC; Bayonne, NJ; Charleston, SC; Newport News, VA; Sunny Point, NC; and the Beaumont-Houston Port complex in Texas.

Jacksonville. Much of the story of how the Port of Jacksonville was put into operation to load the 101st Airborne Division has been told in the introductory section. However, it is also important to note that one of the advantages enjoyed by the operators of that port was the careful planning which had been accomplished routinely in peacetime for just such an eventuality.

Jacksonville was the assigned mobilization station for the 1181st and 1184th TTUs. When the 1181st arrived there on 27 August 1990, it already knew the lay of the land. For several years, Colonel Simmons, as commander of the 1181st, had been a member of the Joint Port Readiness Committee (JPRC). This committee was chaired by the US Coast Guard representative at the Port and included people from the Jacksonville Port Authority, the shipping companies, and the Longshoreman's union. This group met quarterly to discuss readiness problems and to plan for support of mobilization. Although the emphasis had been on preparing for a massive deployment to Europe, the working relationships and procedures established for that plan were modified easily to deal with the needs of OPERATION DESERT STORM.

Other Reserve units also worked at Jacksonville. The 1184th TTU, commanded by Colonel William Blanton, moved into Jacksonville on a 31 day voluntary callup and helped out during a period of peak workload. Later, this unit also served in annual training status at Beaumont. The 1302nd PSD, commanded by Captain Ramon W. Rodriguez, located its headquarters at Jacksonville and sent security detachments as needed to other ports in the Eastern Area.

The 1181st TTU remained at Jacksonville during their entire tour of active duty, except for 7 weeks in Europe during Phase II. During that period the unit loaded 47 ships with 22,171 pieces of equipment covering 3.6 million square feet of area.²⁰

Savannah. The Port of Savannah was needed right away to support the deployment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from nearby Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning, GA. The story of Savannah is a combination of Reserve dedication, flexible leadership, and good luck. Savannah was opened initially by 30 people from the MTMC detachment from Charleston, along with small groups from other elements of MTMC. These people got started on the equipment and loaded the first ship.

By a stroke of good luck, a Reserve TTU was scheduled to start annual training that weekend at the nearby port of Wilmington, NC. On 11 August 1991, the 1185th TTU was diverted from Wilmington to Savannah. The 1185th TTU had been scheduled to support OPERATION BOLD GUARD, a deployment exercise at Wilmington, NC, during its annual training from 12 to 25 August 1990. This had been planned for months, but instead of

practicing how to load ships on its annual training, the unit did the real thing. On 27 August 1990 the 1185th was called to active duty in place, at Savannah.

The 1185th TTU, commanded by Colonel Donald R. Detterline, has the record of having served at the most ports during OPERATION DESERT STORM. The 1185th served as the fire brigade for Eastern Area. During Phase I, the unit worked at Wilmington, Newport News, Bayonne, and Sunny Point, in addition to its service at Savannah. During Phase II, the unit went to Rotterdam and also had some troops at Newport News. After returning from Europe, the 1185th was assigned to Bayonne. The record of this unit typified the capability of the Reserve TTUs to load ships anywhere, anytime.

Wilmington. The Port of Wilmington was operated by the 1176th TTU, commanded by Colonel Calvin S. Powell. The unit was activated on 27 August 1990 and moved to Wilmington to join some of its volunteers already working at the port. The mission was to load out units of the First Corps Support Command. After the workload diminished at Savannah, the 1185th TTU moved to Wilmington to help out. The longshoreman labor supply in this area supports both Wilmington and the ammunition port at Sunny Point, NC, but was insufficient to support both ports at full operational tempo. The ammunition had to be moved, so Wilmington was closed down at that point, and Charleston was used instead.²¹ Later, the Port of Wilmington was used to load out units of I Marine Expeditionary Force.

Charleston. The 1176th TTU moved to the Port of Charleston in early September 1990 to load out additional Army units and elements of the 1st Marine Division. The unit remained at Charleston for a few weeks and then in mid-October moved to Bayonne.

Newport News. After helping out at Wilmington, the 1185th TTU moved to Newport News, VA, to load out additional units and cargo.

Bayonne. The 1176th TTU moved to Bayonne after its work at Charleston and has remained there except for its six week tour at Jacksonville during Phase II. The 1176th TTU moved five times to four ports and loaded 35 ships with equipment having more than 2.5 million square feet of area.²²

Houston-Beaumont Port Complex

The ports of Houston and Beaumont, TX, on the Gulf of Mexico, were used during Phase I to load out the heavy divisions and supporting units from Fort Hood, Texas. The two ports are separate physically but operated essentially as one port. General Smith sent his chief of staff, Colonel Robert L. Zikmund, to Houston to serve as a task force commander for the Houston-Beaumont Port Complex. The major units loaded out from this complex during Phase

I included the 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Armored Division, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, III Corps Artillery, 11th Air Defense Brigade, and the 13th Corps Support Command.

Houston Port was operated by the 1191st TTU, New Orleans, LA, commanded by Colonel Ulysses S. Hargrove. The unit came on active duty on 27 August and has remained on active duty during the entire operation. The unit returned to its home station of New Orleans to load Navy Construction Battalions from the port there.²³ From 30 August 1990 to 19 January 1991, the 1191st TTU loaded 40 ships with 22,500 pieces of equipment.²⁴ The 1191st TTU is back at Houston working on the redeployment at this time.

The 1192nd TTU, New Orleans, LA, commanded by Colonel Charles Kelly, was activated on 27 August 1990 and sent to operate the port at Beaumont. The unit had provided volunteers at Beaumont in the early stages, comprising part of the typical improvised crew that was assembled. The 1192nd remained on active duty for 54 days and during that period loaded 15 ships with equipment having an area of 1.3 million square feet. When the Phase I deployments had been completed, the 1192nd was inactivated on 19 October 1990 with thanks for a job well done.²⁵

The decision to inactivate the 1192nd TTU was typical of the management problems facing MTMC with regard to utilization of their Reserve units. Once the initial Phase I requirements had been met at Beaumont, MTMC could not project additional workload that would justify keeping the unit at that port. MTMC did realize that additional requirements might occur and considered keeping the 1192nd on active duty but in training status at its home station pending new missions. However, MTMC was acutely sensitive to the morale and public perception problems that might arise if Reservists were kept away from their civilian jobs without real military work to do. Accordingly, MTMC decided reluctantly to release the 1192nd from active duty. In retrospect, MTMC could have used the services of the 1192nd TTU for Phase II deployments, but that was not known at the time.²⁶

MOTSU Operations

MOTSU is the acronym for the Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, NC. This is a terminal built specifically to load munitions. The munitions are transported from depots in the Eastern part of the United States by rail and truck to MOTSU and loaded there onto the ships. This was the critical port for the shipment of munitions to Saudi Arabia, and the work was heavy and intense. The existing staff at MOTSU was augmented by the 1185th TTU during the operation.

MOTSU was the work station for the 1205th Railway Services Unit (RSU), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. McGuire. This unit is authorized 5 officers and 142 enlisted personnel--all of them specialists at operating railway equipment. It is one of the Army

Reserve's unique units. The 1205th RSU was needed to augment the peacetime railway operating force at MOTSU. From September 4 to December 18, teams of 12 volunteers from the unit operated on a monthly rotating basis at the port to assist the civilian rail crews move rail cars from the commercial rail interchange to various locations around the port. The work continued on a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week basis.²⁷ The entire unit was called to active duty on 15 January 1991. In addition, volunteers from the 1151st Transportation Company, and two other Reserve railway operating units not designated for MTMC, augmented the 1205th RSU at MOTSU.

Security is a primary concern at MOTSU. The business of loading ammunition is inherently risky, and the possibility of sabotage or terrorism was taken seriously by the MTMC leadership. The 4249th PSD, commanded by First Lieutenant Kevin W. Molsberry, completed its annual training at MOTSU and Wilmington on 18 August 1990, drilled at its home station on 25 August, and was called up on 27 August. The unit worked at Charleston, Newport News, and Jacksonville before settling in at MOTSU. Subsequently, the 6632nd PSD, commanded by First Lieutenant Mel Roy B. Susuico, was activated and sent to MOTSU to provide additional security.²⁸

The 1190th DCU

The 1190th DCU, commanded by Colonel Maurice C. Winker, was one of the original units called to active duty on 27 August 1990. It operated from its home station at Baton Rouge, LA, and sent teams out to deploying units in the eastern part of the United States. Teams from the 1190th worked at 18 military bases in 15 states from Massachusetts to Arizona.²⁹

At first a few of the deploying units did not know how to prepare for a sea movement and initially displayed some reluctance to accept the advice proffered by the 1190th teams. One division, for example, did a poor job initially of labelling their equipment for sea movement. They had expected to be deployed overseas by air, and the organization simply was not prepared for a sea movement. The division sent 5,000 pieces of equipment to a port without proper labels. The 1181st TTU was left with the task of sorting out the equipment and marking it manually. This proved to be very difficult because, for operational security, the division did not have organizational markings on their vehicles. Finally, the division accepted the help of a team from the 1190th DCU and started using LOGMARS labels. The rest of the deployment of the division went smoothly. After that, the word got out, and the support teams from the 1190th were welcomed with open arms by the deploying units.

Western Area Operations

Activity at Western Area ports increased at the start of the deployment, but not with the same intensity as at the East Coast ports. Western Area reinforced the hard-pressed Eastern Area troops in mid-August, sending a 24 person detachment to Jacksonville and a 5 person detachment to Houston. At the same time, volunteers from the 1395th TTU, 1394th DCU, 6632nd PSD, and some Reserve Transportation battalions helped augment Western Area operations to meet the increased workload.³⁰

Reservists were active in all phases of Western Area operations, but their participation differed from that in Eastern Area. The 1395th and 1397th TTUs were not called to active duty but sent teams on temporary tours and in training status to all of the West Coast ports, as needed, to load out equipment for deploying units. For example, when activity started on September 7 at the Pacific Northwest Outport (Tacoma) to load out units from Fort Lewis, WA, the operation was supported by detachments from both the 1395th and 1397th TTUs.³¹ Operations at Los Angeles, Oakland, and Seattle were handled in the same way. Twenty-three IMAs were called up for duty at Western Area Headquarters, where they manned the operations center and assisted in planning and operations.

Phase II Operations

Just as the first phase of deployments from CONUS was brought under control, the President announced on 7 November 1990 that he was sending additional units from both CONUS and Europe to reinforce the Persian Gulf Theater. Thus commenced another period of heavy work load for the personnel of MTMC.

European Operations

The equipment of the units moving from Germany to the Persian Gulf for Phase II was loaded out primarily through 3 ports: Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Bremerhaven. These activities were accomplished under the supervision of Colonel Richard J. Barnaby, Commander, MTMC Europe. To support this task, four Reserve units were sent to Germany on temporary duty. The 1181st TTU was assigned to open and operate a military port at Antwerp, Belgium. The 1185th TTU was assigned to operate a military port at Rotterdam, The Netherlands. In December 1990, the 1186th TTU, commanded by Colonel Frank J. Keiffer, was called to active duty and moved to Rotterdam.³² The 1190th DCU was stationed at Stuttgart, Germany, and sent teams to deploying units throughout Europe as necessary. The 1182nd TTU, Charleston, SC, commanded by Colonel Wayne Covington, was deployed to Bremerhaven and Bremen while on

split annual training. They worked effectively in Germany during all of Phase II and loaded the first Warsaw Pact ships supporting the Persian Gulf operations.

The Port of Antwerp was operated by the 1181st TTU under the indefatigable Colonel Dick Simmons. The unit travelled by air from Jacksonville to Amsterdam. For many unit members it was the first time outside of the United States. They moved to Antwerp, set up shop, planned the operation, and then proceeded from 21 November 1990 to 28 December 1990 to load 27 ships with 9,984 pieces of equipment having an area of 1.7 million square feet.³³ This is an average rate of about one ship every day and a half. The local port authorities, the longshoremen, and the contractors were cooperative and worked hard to get the job done. A port support activity from the 3rd Infantry Division provided excellent support, as did the officers and troops of the 80th Area Support Group.

While the European operation was highly successful, one minor incident did get the attention of the 1181st in Antwerp. After the arrival of the unit on 14 November 1990, most of the officers were busy planning the port operations with the local authorities. A majority of the enlisted personnel had nothing to do while the unit was waiting to be granted access to the port to start loading operations. The 80th Area Support Group offered to arrange sightseeing trips in Europe when time permitted, and a trip to Paris for the troops was scheduled. Knowing that his troops would get no time off once the loading started, Colonel Simmons accepted the offer. However, higher headquarters objected to the excursion as a bad example of frivolity during a serious military operation. The trip was cancelled, and the troops familiarized themselves with the local Belgium Army camp for the next few days. When the contractor took Christmas Day off, the troops also had a holiday and many took a day trip to Paris, which was enjoyed as a brief respite before returning to Jacksonville and more ships to load.

Billeting was also a problem at Antwerp. Although quarters at the port were requested, the 1181st TTU was billeted in a Belgium Army barracks about an hour away from the port. Not only were the quarters austere, but the time taken in travel to and from work was hard for the men working 12 hour shifts. By contrast, the 1185th and the 1186th TTUs at the Port of Rotterdam had quarters in a nice hotel adjacent to the port, so the time spent in commuting was much less than for their comrades of the 1181st.

The 1190th DCU set up headquarters near Stuttgart, Germany, early in November 1990. Unit Movement Teams worked in Wurzburg, Mannheim, Weisbaden, Nurnburg, Ansbach, and other locations. Over 200 Army units were helped in their pre-deployment preparation by these teams. In addition to the normal activities of the DCU, they also helped units to load equipment on barges for shipment by river to the ports at Antwerp and Rotterdam. The word was out, and deploying units welcomed the 1190th DCU with open arms. They contributed significantly to the the deployment from Germany.³⁴

Upon the completion of Phase II deployments from Europe, the 1186th TTU remained there to operate all of the European ports for MTMC Europe. The other three Reserve units returned to the United States for new assignments.

United States Operations

Work continued at the ports on both the East and West Coasts during Phase II. The 1st Infantry Division was loaded out through the Beaumont-Houston complex with the help of the 1191st and 1184th TTUs. The II Marine Expeditionary Force and additional Army combat support and combat service support units were loaded out through Wilmington. The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was loaded out of Los Angeles while other West Coast ports were involved in loading smaller units and shipping supplies.

During Phase II, when three of the active TTUs were in Europe, much of the work in CONUS was done by Reservists on annual training status. The 1173rd TTU worked at Savannah from 12 December to 10 January. The 1174th TTU, at Newport News from 8 to 22 December. The 1189th TTU, at Charleston from 13 to 29 December 1990. The 1184th TTU worked at Beaumont on extended annual training from 23 November to 23 December 1990. As noted above, the 1182nd TTU spent its annual training period operating the port at Bremerhaven, Germany.

The necessity to use the Houston-Beaumont Port complex for Phase II deployments pointed up the premature nature of the decision to inactivate the 1192nd in October 1990. However, MTMC Eastern Area was able to get the work done by using the 1184th TTU on volunteer status.

For Phase II the 1394th DCU was activated at Camp Pendleton to assist the Marine units to prepare for deployment. The 1394th also sent support teams to Forts Hood, Riley, and Carson to assist Army units at these posts. Personnel from the 6632nd PSD provided security at the Military Ocean Terminal Bay Area (Oakland) while on temporary tours, and the unit was later called to active duty for assignment at MOTSU (Sunny Point, NC).

The Redeployment

After the overwhelming victory of the Coalition Forces culminating in the cessation of offensive action on 27 February 1991, MTMC planners' thoughts turned to the task of bringing the troops and their equipment and supplies back to the United States. The Reserves were also going to play an important role in the redeployment. The plans call for 9 new TTUs to be mobilized to replace units now on active duty whose year expires in August 1991. Four TTUs

will be called up in May 1991 and deployed to Saudi Arabia to help load out the units returning to the United States. Five more TTUs will be called up in mid-August 1991, replacing the TTUs at ports in the United States. The 1179th DCU will also be called up to replace the 1190th. The additional callup will mean that all but three of the 18 MTMC Reserve TTUs will have been activated for OPERATION DESERT STORM.

Assignment of TTUs

The contribution of the USAR TTUs to MTMC during OPERATION DESERT STORM is summarized in Figure 5, which shows how the TTUs were assigned during the operation. The ability of the TTUs to move from one port to another and to divide their operations among several ports at the same time was crucial to the success of MTMC in matching loading capability with the shifting demands of the deployment. Particularly noteworthy was the use by MTMC of Reserve units in training status to provide additional loading out capability when and where needed to support the operation. This allowed MTMC to avoid calling up TTUs for which long-term requirements could not be projected. Those units which were not on active duty but participated in the operation while on annual training are asterisked.

Figure 5.

Assignment of TTUs to Ports

Port	27 Aug 90 - 6 Nov 90	7 Nov 90 - 10 Jan 91	11 Jan 91 - 15 Apr 91
Bayonne	1176th 1185th	1176th	1176th
Newport News	1185th	1185th 1174th*	
Wilmington	1176th 1185th		
Charleston	1176th	1189th*	
Savannah		1173rd*	1176th
Sunny Point	1185th	1185th	
Jacksonville	1181st	1176th	1181st
New Orleans			1191st
Beaumont	1192nd	1184th*	
Houston	1191st	1191st	1191st
Antwerp		1181st	
Rotterdam		1185th 1186th	1186th
Bremerhaven		1182nd*	

* Units on annual training

Army Reserve Strengths

Figures 6 and 7 show the contribution of Army Reserve units and IMAs to MTMC strength. Figure 6 shows the unit break out of the initial 200 volunteers authorized for MTMC on 19 August 1990. Figure 7 shows the number of Reservists called up or utilized on training status. The top part of the figure shows the units and individuals called up involuntarily; the bottom part shows the personnel who worked in annual training status.³⁵ The strength shown for 15 December 1990 is the peak strength for the operation.

Figure 6.

Army Reserve Volunteers Authorized for MTMC

1174th TTU:	22
1175th TTU:	6
1176th TTU:	21
1181st TTU:	25
1182nd TTU:	20
1184th TTU:	22
1186th TTU:	26
1189th TTU:	23
1191st TTU:	11
1192nd TTU:	10
IMAs:	11
IRRs:	3
Total:	200

A Few Minor Problems

Although the role of the Army Reserve units in MTMC for OPERATION DESERT STORM is a success story, there were some problems that deserve to be noted. Almost all of these problems were caused by forces and sources outside of MTMC who did not understand the MTMC mission. Problems caused by failure to understand the MTMC mission are excusable perhaps but irritating nonetheless. In several instances both Active and Reserve Component personnel failed to comprehend the highly technical and specialized nature of the work of the DCUs and TTUs.

Figure 7.

Army Reserve Contribution to MTMC Strength
Ordered to Active Duty

Unit	31 Aug 90	15 Dec 90	15 Apr 91
1176 TTU	57	58	60
1181 TTU	65	66	64
1185 TTU	63	68	68
1186 TTU		74	74
1191 TTU	73	74	73
1192 TTU	72		
1190 DCU	79	80	80
1394 DSU		79	79
1302 PSD	66	67	67
4249 PSD	51	52	52
6632 PSD			65
1205 RSU			145*
IMAs	1	60	71
Total	527	678	898

Annual Training and Temporary Tours

Unit	31 Aug 90	15 Dec 90	15 Apr 91
1173 TTU		62	
1174 TTU		57	
1182 TTU	20	25	
1184 TTU	26	53	
1189 TTU	24	80	
1395 TTU	16		
1397 TTU	16	32	
OTHER AD	68	46	25
Total	170	355	25
GRAND TOTAL	697	1,033	923

* Includes 119 members of the 1205th and 26 Reservists from 3 other railway units assigned to MOTSU.

Billeting

One instance of this kind of problem was the reception of the 1181st TTU in Belgium when the local active component area commander billeted the TTU personnel in a Belgium Army barracks an hour away from the port and wanted the troops to stand formation and perform physical training daily. For the TTU, which was working two 12 hour shifts 7 days per week, the additional travel time to and from the barracks was an unwarranted burden, and the requirement to act like new recruits was silly. Fortunately, the TTU commander prevailed and kept his men on the job loading ships around the clock.

The 1181st TTU faced a similar problem when the Army wanted initially to billet them at Camp Blanding, FL, an hour's commute from Jacksonville. Although this might have saved some money on housing, it would have decreased the effectiveness of the TTU personnel, who were working around the clock to load the ships at the port. This obstacle was overcome, and the troops were housed under a contract with a motel close to the port.

ARCOM Actions

The TTUs and other MTMC Reserve units were in the CAPSTONE trace for MTMC, but in peacetime they are under the command of Forces Command (FORSCOM), the CONUS Armies, and various Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs). These units are to be assigned to MTMC after they are called up, but because of the incremental nature of this particular call up there were some problems.

One occurred during the first frantic days when MTMC was soliciting volunteers from the TTUs to operate the ports. The initial reaction of the ARCOMs was to resist releasing the volunteers. The ARCOMs may have believed that allowing volunteers to report for duty would impact adversely on the ability of the TTUs later to mobilize as a unit. Once MTMC explained to FORSCOM the urgency of the situation, the CONUS Armies and ARCOMs facilitated the reporting of the volunteers. Initially, however, there were some delays and confusion.³⁶

Another problem was the action of several ARCOMs to reassign untrained personnel from TTUs to other units within the ARCOM. Although these personnel were required to complete initial entry training, they had drilled with their units for months and could have been sent to rejoin their units when their training was completed. As an example, the 1181st lost 11 split training members to the 121st ARCOM, and this loss reduced the ability of the TTU to perform its mission.³⁷

Retention of TTUs on Active Duty

Some Reservists have wondered why MTMC called up only six of the TTUs and kept five of them on active duty during the entire operation rather than inactivating some and calling others. This decision was made by General Piatak on the basis of efficiency and effective operations. He preferred to keep on duty the units which had already proven themselves rather than call up new and untested units.³⁸

In addition, MTMC had to consider how to cope with any additional workload which could occur in the event of a prolonged war or a redeployment. MTMC also wanted to keep some units available to replace activated units as their period of service ended. However, the period of service kept changing during the operation. Initially the units could be kept for 90 days, then 180 days, and finally for a year. Accordingly, the policy was to minimize the number of units called up to active duty, use other units on training status to meet surge requirements, and keep some units in reserve to meet future requirements.³⁹ This policy treated the Reserve units as assets to be used flexibly to get the mission accomplished. As noted above, most of the TTUs not called up for the deployment are planned to be called for the redeployment--giving almost every unit the opportunity to serve.

Senior IMA Status

The three senior IMAs--General Brooks, Colonel McInvale, and Colonel Bosch--were not called to active duty involuntarily but were instead utilized extensively in a variety of kinds of voluntary active duty--Annual Training, Temporary Tour of Active Duty, Active Duty for Special Work. MTMC called 86 IMAs to active duty involuntarily for OPERATION DESERT STORM, but not the 3 senior IMAs. This could have been significant for the senior IMAs, since the compensation packages are different for AD than for other kinds of inactive training or support duty. It could have been particularly significant for Colonels McInvale and Bosch, whose duty positions as Deputy Commanders for Mobilization of the Eastern and Western Areas respectively called for the grade of brigadier general. While an involuntary call up might have led to promotion, serving in various kinds of voluntary active duty did not.

The three senior IMAs were requested by MTMC to be placed on active duty in their mobilization grades of general officer, but the request was denied by Department of the Army because of the Congressional cap on the number of general officers on active duty. Colonels McInvale and Bosch were recommended for promotion to brigadier general, but approval was denied because Department of the Army did not consider the 200,000 Selected Reserve call up to qualify as a "mobilization" for promotion of colonels holding positions designated for brigadier generals upon mobilization. By the time the problem with the general officer limitation had been overcome (numerous other Reserve general officers were called to active duty), the original request apparently had lost its impetus, and these three officers were never called up

to active duty nor promoted.

General Brooks comments that he and the other senior IMAs were well aware of their status and the decision not to call up Reserve general officers. Because of the urgency of the requirement, however, they decided it was more important to get the job done than worry about duty status. General Brooks "saw no need to mention it to General Piatak at the time." General Brooks also points out that if the personal situations of these three senior officers had not allowed them to take a lot of time away from their civilian jobs, they would not have been available to MTMC.⁴⁰

When asked about this, General Piatak responded that it simply never occurred to him to think about the duty status of his senior IMAs. One of his first thoughts when the deployment started was to call General Brooks and ask him if he were available. From that time on, General Brooks was his right hand man as a troubleshooter and personal representative. General Brooks and Colonels McInvale and Bosch did their jobs and were extremely helpful. That they were not called to active duty appears to be an oversight or simply not necessary, since they were there when they were needed.⁴¹

Unit Equipment Allowances

General Piatak also commented that the operation pointed up the inadequacy of the organizational equipment allowances for transportation terminal units. The TTUs need more and better equipment. They need good computers because these were the life blood of the operation. They have too few radios and no vehicles. MTMC had to rent cars for them to use during OPERATION DESERT STORM. General Piatak remembers an incident in which he was visiting the 1192nd TTU at Beaumont, and he saw a soldier driving around the port in a brand new Lincoln Town Car. The General got upset because he had put out the word not to rent expensive cars. However, upon investigation, it turned out that the soldier was using his own personal car to do the Government's work.⁴²

Why Did the Total Army Concept Work for MTMC?

It is worthwhile considering why the Total Army Concept worked for MTMC. As in any complex case, there are several reasons.

Necessity

It is said that "necessity is the mother of invention." In this case, necessity was the mother of reliance on the Reserves. At the start of the operation, Reserve units and IMAs constituted more than one-third of total MTMC strength and all of the strength that was not already fully occupied. MTMC had no surge capability other than that provided by the Reserve units and IMAs. The leadership of MTMC knew this and understood that they could not accomplish their mobilization mission unless the Reserves were available. This knowledge affected their attitudes and led to a close relationship between Active Army and Reserve leaders throughout MTMC.

The Mission

The MTMC mission puts a premium on technical and management skills. Half of the MTMC work force consists of civilian employees, most of whom had many years of service and knew their jobs well. MTMC military personnel--both Active and Reserve--are specialists who know how to do a particular job very well. The technical nature of these jobs makes it possible for the Reservists to be qualified terminal operators. Technical and management skills are things Reservists can learn to do very well in their inactive duty training. In MTMC, the Reservists went to the same schools as the Active soldiers and learned how to do their jobs during realistic training. This meant that MTMC Reservists, for the most part, could report for duty and start work without delays for additional training.

Realistic Annual Training

One of the most important reasons why the Reserve units and individuals performed so well was the realistic training provided for them by MTMC during peacetime. This was particularly true during Annual Training (AT). For MTMC units, Annual Training was a real challenge and consisted of loading one or two ships during a deployment exercise. MTMC went to a great deal of trouble to set up this training and match the training periods to the exercises. This was not easy, but the TTUs benefitted by doing in peacetime what they would have to do in wartime.

The evolution in the annual training for TTUs illustrates how far MTMC progressed in its integration of the Reserve units into the entire organization. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, TTU annual training consisted of moving blocks of wood representing cargo from one room to another in the old Brooklyn Army Terminal. There was little Active Army participation, and the general opinion was that Reservists were not capable of handling real cargo. However, realization of the importance of the Reserve TTUs brought about some changes. Annual training was changed first to having the TTUs practice on real cargo in a room, and then for the past decade to loading real cargo on real ships during exercises. Allowing the Reserve units to perform terminal operations for major exercises was a courageous decision because the Active Army leaders would have suffered for a Reserve failure. However, the Reservists learned to do the job as part of a Total Army team, and this paid off handsomely during OPERATION DESERT STORM. Indeed, if the same requirement had occurred 10 years ago--before realistic annual training was used--there is doubt that the Reserve units could have performed well enough to accomplish the mission.⁴³

Familiarity

One big feature of MTMC is the integration of the Active and Reserve personnel. This is apparent to even casual observers. Reservists are included in the staff meetings, Commanders' conferences, seminars, and other command events as a matter of course. Reservists were given responsible positions in peacetime and expected to deliver the goods. For example, Colonel Ron Kutka, a full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) officer, is the Chief of the Reserve Components and Mobilization Division on the MTMC staff. He also functions as the Senior Reserve Advisor, but his substantive staff role is as the mobilization planner for the command. Having a senior Reservist to coordinate all Reserve Component activities made it easier to integrate the Reservists into the fabric of MTMC.

When the time came to support OPERATION DESERT STORM, Reserve officers were given responsible jobs--even critical jobs--and treated as full partners. This was possible because the two components were familiar with each other--familiar with the peculiar practices and constraints of full-time and of part-time military service. This familiarity did not breed contempt. On the contrary, it bred respect. Ultimately, it was this mutual respect among all members of MTMC regardless of component which led to the outstanding success of the command in OPERATION DESERT STORM.

MTMC Leadership

One of the reasons for the success of the Total Army Concept in MTMC is the understanding and appreciation of its top leadership for the US Army Reserve. This can be understood, perhaps, by the attitudes and backgrounds of the general officers in MTMC.

Major General Piatak, Commander of MTMC, set the tone for his entire command. His attitude is that "all MTMC planning is focused on having the Reserve Components on hand...because MTMC has to do things early on." He believes that it would be too expensive to give MTMC enough personnel in peacetime to do the whole MTMC job. The Reserve effort in MTMC is an "absolute success story." It is a "seamless effort," and he would not want to be organized any other way.⁴⁴

Major General Joseph H. Brooks, USAR, an Individual Mobilization Augmentee, is the Deputy Commander for Mobilization. He had a full civilian career as a Department of the Army employee, and he had a full military career as a member of the Army Reserve. General Brooks was assigned as the Deputy Commander of MTMC in March 1988, and he worked hard to keep the Reserve program in good shape. After reporting to work on 10 August 1990 in response to General Piatak's call, General Brooks fulfilled the function of Deputy Commander. His primary function was to assure a smooth transition for the Reserve units and individuals being brought in to augment MTMC. In addition, he represented MTMC at meetings with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of the Army Reserve, and other officials, and acted as a trouble-shooter for the Commander. He was involved in the planning and the decisions. He was treated as a "full-fledged member of the MTMC team," and he responded accordingly.⁴⁵

Brigadier General H. A. Smith, Commander of the Eastern Area, epitomizes the outstanding results that can accrue when Reservists are approached with understanding and respect. General Smith obtained his knowledge of the Army Reserve and National Guard because of his experiences during 59 months of service at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. From 1980 to 1982, General Smith commanded the 29th Transportation Battalion. Subsequently, he was the Assistant Chief of Staff G4, and the Commander of the Division Support Command of the 101st Airborne Division. In these duties, General Smith came into contact with numerous Army Guard and Reserve units that came to Fort Campbell to perform training for their wartime missions. He "gained respect for their dedication and knowledge." Upon assuming command of MTMC Eastern Area, he had his Reservists put on the same patch as worn by the Active Component military personnel. General Smith believes in One Army.⁴⁶

Reserve Colonels

The final and perhaps most important reason for the success of the Total Army in MTMC for OPERATION DESERT STORM is the availability of Reserve Colonels who provided the leadership and management skills to handle the expanded work load for the command. When the STORM broke, MTMC was overloaded. The overload was not just in terms of labor, but also in terms of senior officers who could plan, direct, and supervise the work. Simply adding labor was not the answer; that labor had to be directed purposefully. The value of the TTUs and DCUs was to a great extent enhanced because they were led by Colonels with many years of experience.

The MTMC senior reserve leadership included 23 Colonels. These officers commanded the TTUs and DCUs and held the positions of Deputy Commanders of the two areas. They are all competent persons with full military careers. Two of these Colonels played a particularly prominent role during OPERATION DESERT STORM as noted earlier.

Colonel Dick Simmons is an amazing man. He has done enough in his 49 years for six men. He has earned Bachelors degrees in architecture and civil engineering and is working on a Masters degree in political science. He is a successful businessman heading up his own consulting engineer company, while also serving as a local official. He is a registered professional engineer in 10 states. He belongs to and is active in numerous professional and civic associations. And all of this is just his civilian career. In addition, Colonel Simmons has spent the last 24 years with what would be an almost full-time career in the Army. Except for his basic training, he did not serve on active duty until called up for OPERATION DESERT STORM. He was commissioned in the US Army Reserve in 1968 and spent the last 23 years serving as a member of USAR units. He has completed 15 military courses, including the advanced courses for four branches, mostly in non-resident status. He completed the Command and General Staff and is now attending the Army War College in non-resident status. He has served as detachment and company commander in the Chemical Corps and Quartermaster Corps before joining the Transportation Corps in 1971. He has served in many positions in a transportation terminal unit, including operations officer and executive officer before assuming command of the 1181st TTU in January 1989. As a military man, Colonel Simmons has a record of which any Active Component officer would be proud.

Colonel Bob McInvale is another amazing man. His civilian career is as a senior account agent with a large insurance company. He works hard at this job and is highly successful. He has a Bachelor's degree from the University of Southern Mississippi. He has spent over 24 years in the Army, 4 years on active duty and 21 years in the Army Reserve. He started out in the Infantry, won his jump wings, and served in Vietnam as an advisor to a Vietnamese infantry unit. He has spent his Reserve career in Transportation and maintenance units. He has attended the Transportation Corps advanced course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, all in non-resident status. He has served as company commander, battalion commander, and chief of several sections in a transportation terminal unit. As a Colonel, he commanded the 1184th TTU and the 375th Transportation Motor Transport Group. He was assigned to be the Deputy Commander of MTMC Eastern Area in August 1989. Colonel McInvale is highly qualified in the work of MTMC, and he devotes much of his life to advancing that work. When he was asked on 8 August 1990 to open the Port of Jacksonville and get it ready to load equipment in four days, he knew what to do and how to do it.

The really amazing thing about these two officers is that they are typical of the top leadership of MTMC Reserve units. All of these officers donate weekends and many week nights to the Army after working full time on a civilian job. When the call came for

OPERATION DESERT STORM, they came--even when they did not have to. They dropped their civilian jobs, their families, and their settled existence to serve the Army and the Nation. It takes time, training, and lots of hard work to create Colonels like Simmons and McInvale. It cannot be done overnight. If the United States is to benefit in the future from such dedicated and competent senior leadership, it must start now with the junior officers. In no small measure, the success of the Total Army Concept in MTMC occurred because of the experience and dedication of Simmons, McInvale, and the other Reserve Colonels supporting MTMC.

A Final Word

This paper by design has focused almost exclusively on the contribution of the Army Reserve to terminal operations and does not cover all of the other activities of MTMC in support of OPERATION DESERT STORM. There were many other people--active military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors--who worked hard and long to deploy the forces and sustain them. It is not possible either to mention by name all of the Reserve junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and specialists who did the actual work. However, the contribution of all of these people was magnificent.

The Army, along with the other Armed Forces, did a great job in OPERATION DESERT STORM. There is no disputing an overwhelming military victory. As usual, however, in any large and complex operation, some parts worked better than other parts. It appears to go without question that one of the better parts of the operation was the loading out of unit equipment and cargo for the deployment of units to the Persian Gulf. This was done calmly, effectively, and with a minimum of lost time and resources. Much of the credit for this outstanding performance belongs to the members of the US Army Reserve who worked voluntarily or involuntarily to get the job done. Most of the credit belongs to the leadership of MTMC who applied the Total Army Concept properly and reaped the benefits of total teamwork. This can be an instructive lesson for the rest of the Army.

End Notes

1. The convention adopted for this paper is to use the term OPERATION DESERT STORM throughout to mean both DESERT SHIELD--the buildup phase--and DESERT STORM--the combat phase.
2. Mona Lee Goss, "MTMC Meets the Challenge in Jacksonville," Desert Shield Update, Hqs, MTMC, Vol 1, No 4, 14 September 1990, pp 1-2.
3. Western Arrow, Vol 23, No 17, Sep 7, 1990, p 1.
4. Western Arrow, Vol 23, No 17, Sep 7 1990, p 1.
5. The abbreviation MTMC is pronounced "mitt-mick."
6. Public Affairs Office, Hqs MTMC, Ensuring Combat Power Gets to Its Place of Business, Falls Church, VA, August 1989, page 1.
7. Ibid, page 2.
8. Includes both US civilian and foreign national employees.
9. The Naval Reservists are IMAs organized into two units for administration--Unit 202, Staten Island, NY, and Unit 320, Alameda, CA. All but one of the Naval Reservists are officers. Ten were called to active duty for OPERATION DESERT STORM.
10. A passenger liaison unit was inactivated in September 1990.
11. The official meaning of LOGMARS is Logistical Application of Automated Marking and Reading Symbiology, but most people use the simplified version given in the text.
12. Based on an information sheet prepared by the 1190th DCU for distribution to deploying units. It was provided by Major Mariano Hinojosa of the 1190th DCU.
13. Two of the MTMC detachments were in the process of reorganizing to a smaller authorization of only 30 personnel when the deployment started but operated at the higher strength throughout.
14. MTMC Expediter, Vol xiv. No 3, March 1991, p 5.
15. Interview with General Piatak, 12 March 1991.

16. Source: Major General Brooks, 15 April 1991.
17. Interview with General Smith, 1 March 1991.
18. Sources: Colonel Lempke and Mr Bear, 15 April 1991.
19. Source: Hqs MTMC, Christine Olsen, 15 April 1991.
20. MTMC Expediter, Vol xiv, No 4, April 1991, p 4.
21. Source: Major General Brooks, 15 April 1991.
22. Eastern Arrow, Vol xxiv, No 6, March 1991, p 1.
23. Eastern Arrow, Vol xxiv, No 26, March 1991, p 2.
24. MTMC Expediter, Vol xiv, No 4, April 1991, p 1.
25. Eastern Arrow, Vol xxiv, No 2, Nov 1990, p 2.
26. Source: Major General Brooks, 15 April 1991.
27. James S Hendricks, "1205th RSU Shows Volunteer Spirit." Desert Shield Update, HQs MTMC, Vol 1, No 9, January 11, 1991.
28. Eastern Arrow, Vol xxiv, No 1, Sep/Oct 1990, p 1, and MTMC Expediter, Vol xiv, No 3, March 1991, p 1.
29. MTMC Expediter, January 1991, p 7.
30. Western Arrow, Vol 23, No 17, Sep 7, 1990, p 1.
31. Western Arrow, Vol 23, No 21, 2 Nov 90, p 1.
32. Eastern Arrow, Vol xxiv, No 4, January 1991.
33. MTMC Expediter, Vol xiv, No 4, April 1991, p 4.
34. Press Release, 1190th DCU, December 1990, courtesy of Major Mariano Hinojosa, Public Affairs Officer.
35. Office of Reserve Affairs, HQs MTMC.
36. Source: Major General Brooks, 15 April 1991.

37. The ARCOMs were following Army policy at the time, which was not to call up in Phase I Reservists with less than 12 weeks of initial entry training. However, the law requires at least 12 weeks of initial entry training before military personnel can be deployed. These partially trained reservists could have been employed in CONUS. Later, for Phase II, the policy was changed so that partially trained reservists were called up and sent to complete their initial training. For more information on the legal requirements for entrance upon active duty, see Expanded Use of Draftees, Report FP801R1, Logistics Management Institute, February 1990.

38. Interview with General Piatak, 15 March 1991.

39. Source: Major General Brooks, 15 April 1991.

40. Source: Major General Brooks, 15 April 1991.

41. Interview with General Piatak, 15 March 1991.

42. Interview with General Piatak, 15 March 1991.

43. Source: Major General Brooks, 15 April 1991.

44. Interview with General Piatak, 15 March 1991.

45. Interview with General Brooks, 27 February 1991.

46. Interview with General Smith, 15 March 1991.

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